Analyzing Stakeholder Perspectives on the SAC’s Proposed Election in Myanmar
Background overview
On February 1, the State power was seized by the Myanmar military. After the coup, Myanmar military junta announced that they would review the voter lists, and declared that a free and fair election would be held again, with power transferred to the winning party. However, even after more than four years since the coup, no election has been held yet. During these periods, the military junta forces have lost many of their control areas, and resistance forces have managed to penetrate even key cities such as Naypyidaw, Mandalay and Yangon. The fighting has spread throughout the country, and military operations have become widespread. The military junta has been conducting and committing daily atrocities against innocent civilians, including airstrikes and artillery shelling, as well as various other abuses.
The military junta has officially stated that elections will be held in late 2025 and early 2026. The military-appointed Union Election Commission has also announced, “political parties must register, re-register, or merge by May 9, 2025, in order to participate in the upcoming elections. Setting up the deadline for party registration is intended to give enough time to political parties for their election campaigns” (DVB April 9, 2025). However, due to ongoing military conflict, political, and social instability, it remains uncertain whether elections can be held in all areas. There are also concerns about the safety for election and political campaign, legitimacy from the people of Myanmar, trust of political parties, opposing from resistance forces, and the approaches of international organizations and neighboring countries.
This report aims to analyze the perspectives of existing political parties regarding the military junta’s planned elections, as well as the views of parties that have been deregistered or have not re-registered with the UEC, the opinions of EAOs (Ethnic Armed Organizations) and EROs (Ethnic Resistance Organizations), and the view of neighboring countries and international community including experts. While working on the report, the data were referenced from the statements of each relevant stakeholders, including news, declarations, and leaders’ opinions, and other sources. Some data were taken from the electoral workshop findings organized by the federal journal Myanmar and exclusive interviews of leaders.
(a) Views of re-registered political Parties
The Union Election Commission (UEC), formed by the military junta, designated by May 9, 2025, as the final date of applying for political parties or re-registration. In the present, a total of 54 political parties have been allowed to stand as existing political party; 40 of them were previously existing parties which re-registered under the military council and 14 are newly formed parties, according to the available information. (see table for details).
These parties frequently attend meetings convened by the military council or its affiliated organizations and hold discussions with the UEC in cities controlled by the junta, especially Yangon and Naypyidaw. Despite the growing influence of resistance forces, the devastating earthquake impacts in regions like Sagaing, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw, and the general public’s declining trust in elections, political parties continue to prepare for the junta’s planned elections. Below is an outline of their perspectives, preparations, challenges, and expectations related to the upcoming election.
These re-registered political parties see participating in or cooperating with the junta-led elections as a pathway out of the political crisis, economic downturn, security collapse, and expanded armed conflicts in the country. It was known that on May 12, 2025, the 32 political parties met under the theme “Enhancing the Role of Political Parties for the People” to discuss the possibility of holding elections. According to their joint statement, they agreed on 17 discussion points, affirming support for a multi-party system under the 2008 Constitution and advocating for public engagement in election. Rather than focusing on traditional campaign efforts like promoting party candidates, they emphasized the importance of encouraging people to understand that participating in election is vitally important for their families, future and overcome the political juncture of Myanmar. The statement also noted that the 32 parties would support and help the UEC’s efforts to organize the elections by any possible means. (Federal Journal Myanmar 13 May 2025). It was observed that this gathering of the 32 parties prioritized the successful holding of elections over political competition, and are essentially forming a group aligned with the junta’s election roadmap. It also appears that the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is taking the lead in organizing these efforts.
While looking at the political parties which registered under the military junta including some ethnic-based parties, there is a shared perspective that elections offer a potential solution to the country’s political instability, military escalation, and lack of security. They also seem to believe that they have no alternative path besides participating in the elections under the junta’s leadership even if they do not fully support it.
However, even the registered political parties continue to face many difficulties and challenges, especially state or regional level political parties. While major parties may be better prepared, local parties contesting in only one state or region report financial constraints, challenges in member mobilization, security risks, and difficulties in opening party office. Concerning to this context, U Aye Lwin from the Union of Myanmar National Political Force (UMNPF) remarked in an interview with ( DVB 26 Apr 2025 ) “If we open office and signboard, will we get shot? Will they throw a bomb? Or while we’re holding a meeting, will they come and recruit people for the military? Will they arrest us under the military conscription law? Who can guarantee our safety? There are 100% real risks.”
Although the junta and the UEC repeatedly claim that elections will be held, no official election laws or procedural rules have yet been published. Political parties still have not known yet which areas will be prioritized for election, which electoral system is going to use in which parliament and constituencies and so on. Related to this matter, U Nyi Nyi Lwin, deputy Chairman of the Union Peace and Unity Party, told the (BBC 20 Mar 2025)
“As of today, there has been no official announcement from the UEC. But based on our estimation, the electoral laws and procedures must be released by June. If they don’t, then the elections, which the Commander-in-Chief and the State Prime Minister have said would happen in December, won’t be possible without them.”
Although many political parties have officially re-registered, the lack of clarity about the electoral system and the voting system which is seen as serious challenges and uncertainties for political parties planning to contest in the upcoming elections. Regarding this issue, Man Aung Pyae Sone, Chairman of the Karen National Democratic Party (KNDP), said that the only information they’ve received from the UEC was a letter stating that the election is scheduled for December. As a result, the party has been unable to make any meaningful preparations. He explained: “They said the election would happen in December, but we haven’t been told the exact date or the locations. So, we are just waiting it. Since our party is already registered, we’ll have to contest the election. But we don’t know whether elections will be going to be held in every township or just partially in some stable areas. Without this information, we can’t do anything.”
A leader from the Mon Progressive Party similarly stated: “It’s essential to first announce which townships or districts will hold elections. Based on that, we can plan to select our candidates. We need to know clearly in advance which areas will or won’t be included in the elections. Only then we can move to the second step like selecting parliamentary candidates for our party and so on.” These uncertainties have raised questions such as: Should candidate nominations come first, or should the announcement of election dates come first? And how long will be given for the election campaign period? These questions will have to be carefully considered based on when the junta announces the election date. On May 16, the UEC (appointed by the military council) announced that the election date had been tentatively set and would be officially released in due course. This development and related opinions of UEC were reported by Thanlwin Times on May 18, 2025 (သံလွင်တိုင်းမ်၊ မေ ၁၈ ၊၂၀၂၅).
According to reports, there are indications that the junta is planning to change the electoral system to a proportional representation (PR) model. In response to this, Dr. Aye Maung, from the Arakan Front Party, said on (THN 16 Mar 2025): “If elections for Amyotha Hlauttaw (upper house) is conducted under the PR system, how many constituencies will be assigned for a state like Rakhine? Will there be one or two? If all 17 townships in Rakhine are grouped into a single electoral district or constituency under the PR system, then it becomes possible to elect representatives for the upper house through that structure. Since only three townships in Rakhine are under the military’s control, if the PR system is used, those three townships could potentially dominate the entire electoral outcome across all 17 townships.” He took the Rakhine State as an example to raise concerns about fairness and representation.
Additionally, there is no mentioned about the necessary percentage of voter turnout is required to declare a validity of an election, and winner for a given constituency. So, If the election take place, even if only a few people come and vote, the election will be considered valid as there is not such kind of election related requirement. Sai Aik Paug, Chairman of the Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party, told (ဧရာဝတီ ၁၆၊ မေ ၂၀၂၅): “Legally, even if only 1,000 people vote in a constituency of 100,000 eligible voters, the election would still be valid. The law doesn’t say that all 100,000 need to vote, or that 50,000 must vote. It doesn’t say anything like that. Even if only one person shows up, that’s enough for the election to be valid. That’s why I want to appeal to people who are thinking about not voting: please participate in the election.”
Political parties that have re-registered with the military-appointed UEC believe that elections held by the military council could offer a path back to democratic governance or a solution to Myanmar’s current political crisis. However, as of now, even those parties preparing to contest acknowledge that they are still facing many difficulties and challenges.
(b) Views of un-registered political Parties
At present, there are 45 political parties that have been declared dissolved because they have not re-registered as political parties with the Union Election Commission formed by the military council. Among them, some are prominent parties that won in the 2020 general election, such as the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), the Arakan National Party (ANP), and the Ta’ang (Palaung) National Party (TNP). These four parties’ victories in the 2020 general election represented 90 percent of the entire country’s constituencies in the Central level called Pyitaungsu Hlauttaw. This is signifying or a big question for the military junta’s planned election, as the parties which won more than 90% of the seats in the parliament are not going to take part in the election. The following will demonstrate the views and positions of the political parties that have not re-registered with the military council regarding the election.
The election that is now being planned is not politically legitimate, lacks of public support, and is unfair. Moreover, it could drive more division and violence in society. If we truly desire multi-party democracy, we need to show a political willingness, platform that encourage inclusive participation everyone. Joint General Secretary Pu Kam Lam Khup from the Zomi Congress for Democracy – ZCD, pointed out at the round table discussion of the federal journal Myanmar (ဖက်ဒရယ်ဂျာနယ်မြန်မာ Aug 22, 2024) said, “If the military council wants to forcefully hold an election, it can be done so. Why? Because all three branches of power are in its hands. Since they have all those powers, they can force it if they want to. But the extent to which they can do so is limited. If it’s to be a multi-party election, then all parties should be allowed to participate. To attract parties to compete in the election with political dignity, the military council has no capacity to do. So even if they manage to hold the election, I believe the outcome will not be good.” Likewise, U Aung Moe Zaw (Chairman of the Democratic Party for a New Society) also said, “The election cannot be trusted. The military council cannot be trusted either. As long as the Myanmar military exists, our country will never be at peace. Even if they pretend to act good for now, they will just seize power again later. The entire 2008 Constitution and our political system must be replaced. It is only possible when we are able to rebuild with a system truly based on democracy and federalism, and in that rebuilding process, the military group cannot be included only then can we achieve real change in Myanmar. So, our task is to drive the military out.”
U Htun Myint, a Central Working Committee (CWC) member of the National League for Democracy – NLD, also expressed the public’s lack of trust in the election planned by the military council as follows: “The election that will be held by the military council will just be a sham. Not only us, the NLD, but no citizen who desires real justice will accept it. No one will enter and contest the election to represent our party (RFA 10 Mar 2025).”
By not re-registering as political parties under the military council, these parties are refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Myanmar military council, and they are questioning its actions and its planned election. On that topic, Daw Hnin Hnin Hmway, Joint General Secretary of the Democratic Party for a New Society, also said, “Since the military council is an illegitimate body, it has no right to hold elections. And the upcoming election is being considered a sham, so it will not be able to bring about true democracy. Instead, the momentum of the revolution will continue to grow.” (“Is the sham election a solution to the military group’s crisis?” a discussion event organized by the Federal Journal Myanmar, January 28, 2025).
Political parties that have not re-registered with the military council have been questioning on the legitimacy of the military council, pointing out its lack of public support to organize elections, and the constraints imposed by the current military created crisis even deeper. They argue that this crisis cannot be solved through an electoral process, and that the military’s coercive push to hold elections will only bring more instability and possible bloodshed.
(c) Views of EAOs, EROs, and Revolutionary Forces
At present, more than four years have passed since the armed resistance began following the 2021 military coup. In many ethnic states where ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are based, towns are now being captured, and controlled territories are gradually expanding. Under such circumstances, no election can be held in ethnic areas without the consent of these revolutionary groups. In this section will examine the responses and positions of ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and other revolutionary forces regarding the military council’s planned election.
Concerning the military council’s proposed election, Padoh Saw Taw Nee, spokesperson for the veteran revolutionary group called Karen National Union (KNU), stated the following in an interview with ( DVB TV News 2 May 2025):
“our position is very clear: the election held by the military council is illegitimate. It does not represent the will of the people. It’s just an attempt to prolong military dictatorship based on the 2008 Constitution. It’s completely unacceptable. We will not allow it to take place in our territory. That’s something we’ve already made absolutely clear. That’s why I’m saying that we will resist this effort by all means. Why? Because this military dictatorship has done enough harm to us and not just to us, but to future generations as well. It is our duty to bring it to an end. Therefore, we have a responsibility to block the election that is meant to extend the life of military rule. And we will continue to do so.”
He describes the military council’s planned election as an extension and continuation of the military dictatorship, and calls for total opposition to it. Similarly, Salai Htet Ni, spokesperson of the Chin National Front (CNF) an ethnic armed group in Chin State, most of which has been liberated from the Myanmar military control stated:
“Min Aung Hlaing’s main political goal is for the Myanmar military to always be involved in Myanmar’s politics. That’s why he is pushing for an election. But no matter how much they push, this election will have no significance. The results of such an election won’t resolve the crisis in Myanmar or end our revolution. At the very least, in Chin State, under the current circumstances, it is impossible to conduct an election. The key point is that we control nearly all the territory of their military bases, so holding an election just won’t be feasible (Western News 7 May 2025).” Regarding the planned election, Colonel Saw Kyaw Nyunt, spokesperson for the 7 EAO Alliance, which includes seven ethnic armed organizations, also stated: “Elections are a component of democratic systems. However, given the current situation, there are concerns. Some political parties and neighboring countries support the election to be held by the military council, whereas unregistering parties and revolutionary forces have also clearly opposed. As a result, we are concerned that this election may lead to more harm than good (လွတ်လပ်သော မွန်သတင်းအေဂျင်စီ၊ မေ ၁၄၊ ၂၀၂၅ ) ။.”
Furthermore, U Nay Phone Latt, spokesperson for the Prime Minister’s Office of the National Unity Government (NUG), said, “We already have election results. The election results already existed. He (Min Aung Hlaing) didn’t like those results, so he annulled them. Now he’s trying to hold another election according to his own wishes. And who’s doing this? The military leader who is violently suppressing, torturing, and killing the people. He’s a fugitive wanted under international law. The people of Myanmar do not recognize the authority of this military junta. So, any election organized by such a group is illegal. That’s why we oppose it. This is not just an illegitimate fake election; every single action of the brutal military is unlawful. We will dismantle it all (ခေတ်သစ်မီဒီယာ 1 Jun 2025).”
From these perspectives, we can identify three major points in how revolutionary forces view the military council’s planned election: the military does not have a legal mandate from the people to conduct elections, the planned sham election is a deceptive maneuver to prolong the military’s hold on power, and it is far from yielding positive results, the election will only increase violent conflict and bloodshed. Thus, revolutionary groups express that they will actively oppose and dismantle this election effort.
(d) Views of International Organizations and Experts
Regarding the election planned by the military council: There are different positions held by countries, international organizations, and experts. When examining the stances of regional organizations such as ASEAN, it is evident that instead of taking a clear and firm approach either supporting or opposing their responses have generally been cautious and have avoided direct confrontation. In particular, the positions of individual member states have also varied.
Currently, the ASEAN Chair has stated that lack of inclusive participation in the coming election to be held by the Myanmar military council is reflecting the widespread skepticism and opposition to the military council’s actions, as well as the lack of broad acceptance of the regime’s control over the country. In this context, the election plan of the military council is described as “merely a political maneuver” (MPA 26 May 2025). Dr. Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a Myanmar political analyst, also commented, “Without the participation of major political forces, the election process will not be inclusive and will only serve to reinforce the military’s dominance, potentially leading to greater internal conflict” the Federal Journal, Myanmar, January 28, 2025.
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) has also noted that the military council’s preparations for the election, excluding political parties that won in the 2020 general election, and the increasing repression against civilians, have led member countries of the United Nations to call for non-recognition of the military council’s planned election (RFA Burmese, 2025.03.03). Similarly, Human Rights Watch has stated, “ASEAN member states, as well as Japan, South Korea, and India, should strongly oppose the military council’s election, which would legitimize military rule. They should not provide any technical support for the election process. This is because, following the coup, the military council has detained and suppressed political leaders and parties, so there is no possibility of a free and fair election” (RFA Burmese, 2025.03.12). Other international organizations have also expressed that the military council’s election is a political maneuver designed to maintain power and will not bring any benefit to Myanmar. They have stated that the election cannot be considered free or fair.
On the other hand, some countries have also taken the side with the military junta. For example, Myanmar’s neighboring countries such as China, India, and Thailand, as well as countries that have close relations with the military council, like Russia and Belarus, have stated that they will support the election if it is held by the military council, due to their close political ties. Many organizations and countries have said they will neither support nor recognize the election. They have indicated that if the election is merely a show orchestrated by the military council, many of them may reconsider their diplomatic relations with the junta.
Analysis on Election
As mentioned above, Myanmar’s current political crisis is characterized by diverse and sometimes conflicting political stances and approaches from various organizations and stakeholders. The political parties which have registered under the military council have responded that by cooperating with the military council and participating in the election process it has planned, seeing this as a potential way out of Myanmar’s political crisis. On the other hand, there are political parties that refuse to cooperate with the military council, as well as federal democratic forces, EAOs, and EROs that are actively resisting the military coup and working toward the establishment of a federal democratic union. These groups do not recognize the military council’s planned election as legitimate, nor do they see it as a viable solution to the crisis. Furthermore, in areas under the control of resistance forces, the military council’s election is unlikely to be held, and in contested or mixed-control areas, attempts to hold elections could result in further violence and bloodshed.
Currently, Myanmar’s political crisis, which has persisted for over five years, has led to widespread economic hardship, daily insecurity, uncertainty, and a lack of hope for the future among the population in Myanmar. The future of the country’s children is also at stake. In this context, finding a way out of the crisis that can bring about a breakthrough is of utmost importance for all sides. However, the extreme polarization and divergent approaches make it difficult to reach a solution. In considering possible ways out of the crisis, it is clear that the military council’s election plan is being implemented without the consent or participation of resistance groups or the input of political parties unregistered. So, the election is likely to be forcibly organized according to the military council’s initial objectives.
The reason for this is that, according to the 2008 Constitution, the military automatically holds 25% of all level of parliamentary seats. In many areas, it is not possible to hold elections due to the prevailing situation. In some constituencies, the number of eligible voters and actual voters is not transparent, yet parliamentary representatives are still officially recognized. This does not meet basic standards. On the other hand, there are widespread reports that in ethnic regions where military council troops are stationed and where there is ongoing conflict, there are significant challenges and security concerns related to holding elections. At a time when such issues are widely discussed, the military council continues to claim the legitimacy of its planned election.
The reason this can be said is that under the 2008 Constitution, the military is guaranteed 25 percent of seats in all legislatures. Therefore, it can be argued that elections do not need to be held in many areas to constitute and legitimize a functioning parliament according to the law. There is no set standard for the minimum number of voters in a constituency to legitimize the election of a parliamentary representative. On the other hand, at a time when reports widely indicate the military council is facing territorial losses and security challenges in ethnic regions, the military junta leader defended the legitimacy of the planned election by citing provisions of the 2008 Constitution. “According to Sections 85, 128, and 155 of the 2008 Constitution concerning parliamentary sessions” Min Aung Hlaing stated during the coordination meeting of the State Administration Council (SAC) government held on May 19 that “only 56 elected representatives and 166 military-appointed representatives are enough to convene a parliament Myanmar Now”. Based on that reasoning, holding elections only in Yangon Region could be sufficient to form a Union Parliament with the required number of representatives.
However, in the current situation, it is extremely unlikely that the majority of the public would be willing to vote in the election planned by the military council in December 2025. The credibility of this election will also depend on what kind of political commitments the military council makes in the interim period, and how genuinely they express intentions for peace in Myanmar. For instance, these include the unconditional release of political prisoners and the establishment of a credible political roadmap that includes commitments to reduce the military’s role in politics after the election, address ethnic issues, and implement federal reforms. Without these basic political intentions, the upcoming election could be nothing more than a performative exercise. Moreover, political parties that register under the military junta in such conditions might push the situation into a direct confrontation path between the political parties and resistance groups. Meanwhile, discussions about changing the voting and electoral system including a proportional representation system in some legislatures indicate that the military is preparing a situation that allows manipulation of voter turnout and results, further raising concerns about election integrity.
Conclusion
During the five-year period since the violent military council seized power, the public has endured countless hardships. These broad and intense crises cannot be resolved by the military council’s planned election. The reason is that the path pursued by the military council and its registered political parties, and the path pursued by the EAOs, EROs, and revolutionary forces, are fundamentally polarized. Therefore, bringing these two extremes closer together depends solely on the political will, political commitments, and political mediation efforts undertaken by the military council.
References:
- Independent medias
- Ethnic medias
- Data compilation and exclusive interviews by the Federal journal Myanmar
